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projecting oneself into the plight of a bat, for instance,
may indeed be impossible. 3 If so, and if compassion
necessarily has an imaginative component, our ability
to feel compassion for animals, especially those that
have significantly different experiential lives than we
do, would be severely restricted. Snow argues that her
account of compassion would remove this restriction.
She argues, here and elsewhere, that the source's
having certain sorts of beliefs about the target is
sufficient, even in the absence of any sort of
imaginative projection. We can have-and justifythe beliefs necessary to feel compassion even for
animals so different from us that we cannot imagine
what it would be like to be such a creature.
A full, general commentary on this debate about the
nature of compassion should start with a more detailed
explanation of what is involved in imagining and
imaginative projection and an account of what, if
anything, really distinguishes it from having the right
sorts of beliefs. While this approach might shed light
on some aspects of Snow's general analysis and might
even reduce the distance she tries to establish between
her theories and imagination-based alternatives, it would
lead us away from a specific focus on compassion
toward animals. I will, therefore, turn to issues that bear
more directly on an attempt to determine whether
Snow's analysis does, in fact, give us a better and
broader understanding of our ability to feel compassion
for animals. I have three general "requests for
clarification" and then some general questions about
how any account of compassion might affect our
judgments about moral obligations.
The first request for clariftcation concerns the notion
of "identifying with." It is clear how we are to identify
with the target of compassion on an imagination-based
analysis: we imaginatively project ourselves into or take
up the target's point of view. Thus, imagination provides
both the act of identifying, and the content of the
identification. How does identification work on Snow's
belief-based analysis? After all, Snow retains the
condition that the source must be able to identify with
the target, even though it may not be able to imagine
what being the target is like.
Snow tells us that the various states we believe the
target to be in need not be thought to be identical with
any state we have experienced. That is precisely why a
belief-based analysis allows for compassion in cases
where the imagination-based account falls flat, cases
in which the target is vastly different from the source
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Professor Snow has offered an original and
illuminating analysis of compassion which, among its
other virtues, provides a plausible account of why we
feel compassion for animals and why it is rational to do
so. I fully endorse her general approach, so my
comments will not be in any wayan attempt to
undermine or refute her analysis; instead, I wish to raise
some questions that follow on the heels of an acceptance
of her account.
To summarize very briefly: Professor Snow's
account of compassion for animals is part of a larger
exploration of the correct way to understand compassion
in general. l She agrees with other analyses which claim
that compassion requires that the individual feeling
compassion must "identify with" the being (more
accurately, identify with the plight of that being) for
which compassion is felt. (In what follows, I will refer
to the being which feels compassion as "the source"
and the being for which compassion is felt as "the
target.") However, she disagrees with Piper and Blum2
about what is required for such an identification. Piper
and Blum think that imagination is a necessary
component of any act of identifying with, Le. that the
source of compassion must imaginatively "project'!
herself into the situation of the target. The problem wj.th
this account is that demanding such an act of
imagination, if true, would cast doubt on our ability to
feel compassion for many nonhuman animals.
Philosophers, at least since B.A. Farrell and
Thomas Nagel, have noted that imaginatively
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its focus on feelings and experiences. Whichever
interpretation is selected, it is clear that we need to
investigate more fully what the identification process
requires and allows before we can assess the scope of
possible feelings of compassion for animals.
The second question has to do with Snow's claim
that we need not rely on direct justification (e.g.,
objective, scientific demonstrations of the nature of pain
in a nonhuman species) in order to establish the
legitimacy of compassion. According to her theory,
indirect justification which relies on compassion's
coherence with a larger network of beliefs, attitudes,
actions, and emotions is often sufficient. It is not yet
clear to me whether the entire feeling of compassion is
indirectly justified, as suggested by her remarks about
warranting the enwtion, or simply the beliefs about the
target's states, as she seems to suggest later, when she
alludes to "the coherence of its accompanying beliefs
with other beliefs, emotions, values, and attitudes"
[emphasis mine]. If it is the former, Snow would have
imported a whole new account of compassion which is
to be evaluated holistically, rather than as an emotion
whose justification depends on the justification of the
beliefs which form a necessary component. If it is the
latter, we need some further argument as to why these
beliefs ought to be allowed a special epistemic status,
why they need not be held to the same standards of
accountability as any other belief. Or, perhaps indirect
justification is an option for all sorts of beliefs, not just
those which form the basis for compassion. We simply
need to know more before we can decide whether an
appeal to indirect justification is a legitimate option.
Questions about justification are related to our first
area of questioning about identification with the target
and similar vulnerability. There, we were unclear about
the content of beliefs that were to provide the basis of
the source's identification with the target: what did the
source have to believe about the nature of the target's
plight in order to feel compassion? Knowing more about
the content of beliefs might shed light on this second
issue as well, since questions of indirect justification
are more easily addressed if we know more about the
nature of the beliefs involved. This is not an attack on
Snow's theory; it does not identify anything like a
contradiction or fatal flaw. We simply need to know
more about the beliefs and their content in order to
develop the theory fully.
This concern about what can be indirectly justified
leads naturally into my third area of puzzlement. In her

of compassion. Identification apparently only requires
that the source believes that s/he is vulnerable in ways
that are similar in some respect to the way the target is
vulnerable, and that both are liable to misfortune. But
does that tell us enough about what sort of identification
is necessary or sufficient for compassion?
On a fairly natural, but narrow or "strict," reading
of "similarly vulnerable," it would be plausible to argue
that I share only very limited sorts of vulnerability with
a bird: perhaps physical pain and acute terror are the
only sorts of vulnerabilities that we share. On this
interpretation, the idea of similar vulnerability is
grounded in shared experiential harms. The source's
compassion is directed to the specific sort of suffering
that the target is believed to be experiencing. This could
still be much weaker than the requirements set by
imagination-based theories: we don't have to believe
that the bird experiences terror or the pain of a broken
leg in exactly the same way we do, and we certainly
don't have to be able to imagine ourselves in that
situation. But we do have to believe that the
vulnerabilities are in some way similar, and this narrow
reading asks us to focus on harms that are experienced
in a similar fashion as negative or harmful. The result
is something that is certainly less restrictive than an
imagination-based theory of compassion but which
nonetheless imposes limitations on what we can feel
compassion for.
A different, broader reading of "similar vulnerability" would not put so much weight on similarity of
experienced suffering. On this view, trees, paintings,
species, and ecosystems, as well as sentient creatures,
might be viewed as potential subjects of misfortune.
They can sustain damage; something required for their
proper functioning can be withheld; and they can die.
Even when they do not experience these harms, the
damage done to them is similar in other ways to threats
to which we are also vulnerable. This broader
perspective is consistent with Snow's suggestion that
the idea that "existential vulnerabilities" such as death
might afford a sufficient basis for identification.
However, subsequent remarks suggest that this might
be too weak a connection.
Lacking any firm answer in Snow's account to date,
we would have to extend the investigation to determine
what sorts of shared vulnerabilities are in fact the most
appropriate grounding for compassion. My preliminary
suggestion is that the etymology of "compassion""feeling with"-favors the narrow interpretation with
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None of my questions are intended as an attempt to
undermine Professor Snow's analysis of compassion
for animals. On the contrary, I believe it offers a valuable
addition to arguments about moral obligations to
animals. I do hope, however, that they provide a
springboard for further discussion.

paper, Snow identifies different ways of "going wrong."
That is, in some cases, someone thinks she is feeling
compassion, when in fact she is undergoing some other
sort of state. 4 In other cases, the source really does have
compassion, but the compassion is irrational. Finally,
compassion can be. real and rational, but morally
inappropriate. Indirect as opposed to directjustification
of the beliefs (or of the entire emotion) would make it
much more difficult to keep this distinction sharp. The
need for precision is likely to be especially acute in
cases of compassion for animals, with charges of
"anthropomorphism," silly sentimentalism, and outright
battiness bandied about with great abandon. Thus, it
will be important to sort out these distinctions with care.
Finally, I would like to move past the requests for
clarification that have concerned us to date to expand
the scope of the discussion beyond the particulars of
Snow's analysis. In particular, I want to close with a
preliminary examination of the context within which
any analysis of compassion would naturally be situated.
Let me begin by noting that I take Snow to accept the
view that compassion not only can move us to action
but that it may properly function as a component of our
moral judgments. I attribute this position to her because
if she were to reject it, the discussion of the moral
inappropriateness of some instances of compassion
would make no sense.
A more general consideration of this moral context
prompts the question of whether compassion is ever a
necessary condition for morally appropriate conduct.s
Can one be truly moral without compassion? Whether
or not it is necessary, is it ever justifiable to charge
someone with an irrational or inappropriate failure to
feel compassion? It seems to me that Snow's theory
may provide more of a basis for such a charge than
imagination-based theories.
Surely it is possible to argue that failure to believe
certain things is irrational; e.g., one might plausibly
argue that someone who does not believe that dogs feel
pain is being irrational. But if it is irrational to reject
the beliefs (a) that dogs are sentient, (b) that this
particular dog is suffering, and (c) that one is, oneself,
"similarly vulnerable," it is a very short step to the
further claim that there is something wrong with a failure
to feel compassion for that dog. The fact that Snow's
account does not demand the ability to imaginatively
project oneself into the dog's situation removes an
important possible justification/excuse for not feeling
compassion in such a case.
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Also, more famously, Thomas Nagel, "What is it Like to Be a
Bat?" Philosophical Review (1974) pp. 435-450.
4 This is again relevant to the fIrst concern raised in this
paper. If we adopt the narrow interpretation of "similar
vulnerability," and if that rules out the possibility of feeling
compassion for some things, Snow's theory gives us the
corrective move of saying that we may have thought we were
feeling compassion when instead we were in some distinct
but similar state.

5 To avoid misunderstanding, I should note that I am not
attributing to Snow the claim that compassion is sufficient
for justifying moral judgments or actions; she merely commits
to the view that compassion can properly be part of the
motivation or justification of moral activities.
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